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CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
Caroline Mala Corbin* 
INTRODUCTION 
Do for-profit corporations have a right to religious liberty? 
That is, may a business that sells craft materials or manufactures 
wood cabinets be excused from obeying a law because it imposes 
a substantial burden on its religious conscience? This question 
was front and center in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.1 
According to the Supreme Court, the answer is yes: Corporations 
are “persons” entitled to religious exemptions under the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 
The Hobby Lobby case was one among dozens challenging 
the Obama administration’s “contraception mandate.” The 
Affordable Care Act requires large employers to provide health 
care insurance that offers basic preventive care at no extra cost to 
employees.2 For women, basic preventive care includes FDA-
approved contraception.3 This contraception requirement 
triggered intense religious opposition. For example, Catholic 
doctrine condemns artificial birth control, and the United States 
 
 * Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. B.A., Harvard University; 
J.D., Columbia Law School. For their helpful comments, I owe thanks to Aaron Caplan, 
Mary Coombs, Andrew Dawson, Fred Gedicks, Paul Horwitz, Heidi Kitrosser, Chris 
Lund, Helen Louise Norton, Zoe Robinson, Tom Rutledge, and Tali Schaefer as well as 
participants at Yale Law School’s Debating Law and Religion Series, DePaul Law School’s 
Conference on Religious Institutions in a Democratic Society, Harvard Law School’s 
Conference on Religious Accommodations in the Age of Civil Rights, and Free Speech 
for People and Harvard Law School’s Conference on Advancing a New Jurisprudence for 
American Self-Government & Democracy. Many thanks as well to Barbara Brandon, 
Charlotte Cassel, Brooke Flanders, Christina Himmel, Adam Hoock, Annie Jensen, 
Adrienne Scheffey, and Shekida Smith for excellent research assistance. Thanks are also 
due to Michael A. Cheah for his insightful comments and editing. Copyright © 2014 by 
Caroline Mala Corbin. 
 1. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 2. The Act requires an employer’s group health plan to cover “preventive care” 
without any cost-sharing. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 2713(a)(4), 124 
Stat. 119, 131 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4)). 
 3. As recommended by the independent Institute of Medicine, women’s preventive 
care was defined to include FDA-approved contraception methods. 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 
8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54). 
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Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) complained that the 
mandate represents “an unprecedented . . . violation of religious 
liberty.”4 The President of USCCB went so far as to decry the 
mandate as “simply un-American.”5 
Not all employers, however, were affected by the 
contraception mandate in the same way. Religious employers 
such as churches, synagogues, mosques, temples, and their 
auxiliaries have always been completely exempt.6 Religiously 
affiliated non-profit employers such as Catholic Charities are 
essentially exempt,7 and were for a long time protected by a safe 
harbor while the administration finalized its compromise plan.8 
Consequently, challenges brought by for-profit corporations were 
the first to reach the Supreme Court.9 
Corporate plaintiffs asserted that forcing them to provide 
contraception violated their right to religious liberty guaranteed 
by the Free Exercise Clause10 and the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act.11 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., a national chain of 
arts and crafts stores, sought an exemption from the contraception 
mandate on the ground that requiring it to offer employees 
certain types of birth control violates its religious conscience.12 
The plaintiff in a companion case, Conestoga Wood Specialties 
 
 4. Press Release, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, USCCB Says 
Administration Mandate Violates First Amendment Freedoms of Religious Orgs. and 
Others (March 20, 2013), http://www.usccb.org/news/2013/13-054.cfm. 
 5. Timothy Dolan, Editorial, HHS Contraception Mandate Un-American, USA 
TODAY, Jan. 25, 2012, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/
story/2012-01-25/dolan-hhs-health-contraceptive-mandate/52788780/1. 
 6. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 39,873-39,874 (June 28, 2013). 
 7. Religiously affiliated non-profit employers do not have to include contraception 
in their health insurance plans or “contract, arrange, pay, or refer for contraception 
coverage.” Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 
Fed. Reg. 39,874 (June 28, 2013). Instead, their employees would receive a separate 
contraception policy paid for by a third-party insurer. Id. 
 8. During the safe harbor time period, lawsuits brought by non-profit plaintiffs were 
generally held in abeyance or dismissed as unripe. See, e.g., Wheaton Coll. v. Sebelius, 703 
F.3d 551, 553 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding case in abeyance). 
 9. Plaintiffs actually include corporations and their owners. This Article focuses on 
the novel question of whether corporations qua corporations are ever entitled to religious 
exemptions. For the owners, the question is not whether they can bring free exercise 
claims—as natural people, they can—but whether the claim has any merit. That question 
is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free 
exercise [of religion]).” 
 11. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-
4 (2011). 
 12. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1120–21, 1124–25 (10th Cir. 
2013). 
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Corporation, a manufacturer of wood cabinets, advanced similar 
claims,13 as have businesses that sell outdoor power equipment,14 
recycle scrap metal,15 and manufacture vehicle safety systems16 
and HVAC equipment.17 
Whether the Free Exercise Clause and the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act protect corporate “people” in the same 
way they protect natural people was a question of first impression. 
For-profit corporations had never before sought conscientious 
objector status and the Supreme Court had never before 
evaluated corporate religious liberty.18 While the Supreme Court 
did not reach the Free Exercise Clause question, it did rule that 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) covers closely-
held19 for-profit corporations.20 It also concluded that the 
objecting businesses should be exempt from the contraception 
mandate.21 
From start to finish, much of the Court’s reasoning is 
questionable. Rather than focus on the Court’s missteps when 
applying RFRA’s substantial burden and strict scrutiny tests,22 
 
 13. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 381–82 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 14. Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988 (E.D. Mich. 2012). 
 15. Am. Pulverizer Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 12-3459, 2012 
WL 6951316, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 20, 2012). 
 16. Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 852 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 17. Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1292 (D. Colo. 2012). 
 18. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. 641, 643 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, Circuit Justice, 10th Cir.) (writing that the Supreme Court “has not previously 
addressed similar RFRA or free exercise claims brought by . . . for-profit corporations”). 
 19. Although there is no single definition of “closely-held corporation,” there is 
consensus that a closely-held corporation is characterized by a small number of 
stockholders. The IRS, for example, defines a closely-held corporation as one where more 
than 50% of the stock is owned by five or fewer individuals. Entities, Frequently Asked 
Tax Questions & Answers, IRS (updated Jan. 1, 2015), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/Help-&-Resources/Tools-&-FAQs/FAQs-for-Individuals/Frequently-
Asked-Tax-Questions-&-Answers/Small-Business,-Self-Employed,-Other-Business/
Entities/Entities-5. 
 20. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014) (“[W]e hold 
that a federal regulation’s restriction on the activities of a for-profit closely held 
corporation must comply with RFRA.”). 
 21. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2785 (“The contraceptive mandate, as applied to closely 
held corporations, violates RFRA.”). 
 22. Among other things, the Court erred in its willingness to find that facilitation of 
other people’s sins via employee health insurance was a substantial religious burden; its 
reluctance to recognize that making contraception available to working women was a 
compelling state interest; and its conclusion that the contraception mandate failed strict 
scrutiny because third parties (the insurers or government) could provide the health care 
instead. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2775–85. 
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this Article criticizes the necessary predicate:23 the idea that for-
profit corporations possess religious rights and qualify for 
religious exemptions.24 
There is no principled basis for corporate religious liberty.25 
For-profit corporations lack the inherently human characteristics 
that justify religious exemptions for individuals. They cannot, for 
example, be said to possess either a relationship with God or 
inherent dignity. Nor do they possess the unique qualities that 
arguably justify exemptions for churches. Unlike churches, for-
profit corporations are not sacred, primarily religious, or the 
source of theological truth. They are not even voluntary 
associations—employees at for-profit corporations simply cannot 
be equated to the voluntary members of a church. Furthermore, 
the deleterious consequences of corporate religious liberty, 
magnified by corporations’ extensive power, argue against its 
recognition. Part I addresses the theoretical question and Part II 
discusses the harmful results of corporate religious liberty. 
PART I: THE ILLOGIC OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY 
The Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act are meant to protect the religious practices of 
 
 23. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2767 (“The first question that we must address is whether 
[RFRA] applies to regulations that govern the activities of for-profit corporations like 
Hobby Lobby [and] Conestoga.”). 
 24. Most scholars writing on this question agree that for-profit corporations have 
religious liberty rights. See, e.g., Jeremy M. Christiansrreen, “The Word[] ‘Person’ . . . 
Includes Corporations”: Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Protects Both For- 
and Nonprofit Corporations, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 623 (2013); Ronald J. Colombo, The 
Naked Private Square, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2013) [hereinafter Colombo, Naked Private 
Square]; Scott W. Gaylord, For-Profit Corporations, Free Exercise, and the HHS Mandate, 
91 WASH. U. L. REV. 589 (2014); Michael A. Helfand, What is a “Church”?: Implied 
Consent and the Contraception Mandate, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 401 (2013); 
Andrew B. Kartchner, Corporate Free Exercise: A Survey of Supreme Court Cases Applied 
to a Novel Question, 6 REGENT J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 85 (2014); Mark L. Rienzi, God and 
Profits: Is There Religious Liberty for MoneyMakers?, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 59 (2013); 
Jonathan T. Tan, Nonprofit Organizations, For-Profit Corporation, and the HHS Mandate: 
Why the Mandate Does Not Satisfy RFRA’s Requirements, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1301 
(2013); Robert K. Vischer, Do For-Profit Businesses Have Free Exercise Rights?, 21 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 369 (2014) [hereinafter Vischer, For-Profit Businesses]; but see 
James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1565 (2013); Thomas 
E. Rutledge, A Corporation Has No Soul—The Business Entity Response to Challenges to 
the PPACA Contraception Mandate, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1 (2014); Elizabeth 
Sepper, Contraception and the Birth of Corporate Conscience, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 303 (2014). 
 25. “Corporate religious liberty” is shorthand for the religious liberty of secular for-
profit corporations. While non-profit groups may also incorporate, I will generally refer to 
non-profit corporations as non-profit organizations for the sake of simplicity. 
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individuals and churches. At the core of religious liberty is respect 
for the religious conscience of natural people. This is a uniquely 
human characteristic that corporations do not possess. 
Furthermore, attempts to equate for-profit corporations to 
churches and other voluntary religious associations are bound to 
fail. Thus, the reasons to protect people and churches do not apply 
to for-profit corporations. 
While Hobby Lobby relied on RFRA rather than the Free 
Exercise Clause, RFRA is inextricably connected to the Free 
Exercise Clause. Congress passed RFRA in response to 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. 
Smith,26 a Supreme Court decision that weakened Free Exercise 
Clause protection. As the “Restoration” in its name indicates, 
RFRA was intended to restore as a matter of statutory law the 
pre-Smith constitutional test. RFRA’s language also 
demonstrates that it meant to track the Free Exercise Clause. For 
example, RFRA’s statement of purpose discusses religious liberty 
in terms of the Free Exercise Clause, noting that “the framers of 
the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an 
unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment 
to the Constitution.”27 The original statute also defined “exercise 
of religion” as “the exercise of religion under the First 
Amendment to the Constitution.”28 Thus, RFRA’s text explicitly 
connected the scope of its protection to the protection offered 
under the Free Exercise Clause.29 Because the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act is informed by free exercise jurisprudence, the 
analysis focuses on religious liberty under the Free Exercise 
Clause. 
A.  RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AS A PERSONAL RIGHT 
Religious liberty may be conceived as enabling the individual 
to fulfill her religious obligations or as respecting the individual’s 
autonomous religious decisions.30 Either way, it is meant to 
 
 26. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 27. RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(1) (2013) (emphasis added). 
 28. Pub. L. No. 103-141 §5, 107 Stat. 1488, 1489 (1993). 
 29. See also S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 8 (1993) [hereinafter Senate Report] (“The 
Committee expects that courts will look to free exercise cases decided prior to Smith for 
guidance in determining whether the exercise of religion has been substantially 
burdened . . .”); H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 6–7 (1993). (“It is the Committee’s expectation 
that the courts will look to free exercise cases decided prior to Smith for guidance in 
determining whether or not religious exercise has been burdened . . . .”). 
 30. Because these categories are not mutually exclusive, religious liberty can be 
viewed as advancing both. 
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protect uniquely human attributes: a person’s relationship with 
God,31 or a person’s conscience, dignity, and autonomy. 
Consequently, religious liberty is uniquely human, and it makes 
no sense to extend it to for-profit corporations. Indeed, although 
the Supreme Court dismissed any difference between a profit-
seeking person and a profit-seeking corporate person,32 the 
distinction is obvious: only one involves an actual human being. 
Whether a particular constitutional clause reaches for-profit 
corporations depends not on the personhood of the corporation 
but on the scope of the clause. In deciding whether corporations 
are “persons” protected by the Constitution, the Supreme Court 
has sometimes answered “yes,”33 and sometimes answered “no.”34 
It has never announced an overarching framework for analyzing 
corporate rights.35 The closest the Court came to doing so was in 
 
 31. Although most religious people in the United States belong to a faith that centers 
around a God, not all of them do. Some religious people have different names or 
conceptions of their Supreme Being, while other believers have no gods/goddesses at all. 
For the sake of simplicity, however, I will refer to the spiritual dimension as an individual’s 
relationship with her “God” or “Creator,” aware that it does not quite capture all 
spiritualties. 
 32. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2770 (“If, as Braunfeld recognized, a sole proprietorship 
that seeks to make a profit may assert a free-exercise claim, why can’t Hobby Lobby [and] 
Conestoga . . . do the same?”). 
 33. The Supreme Court has held that corporations have Fourth Amendment rights 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311, 
325 (1978), and Fifth Amendment rights against double jeopardy, United States v. Martin 
Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 565–67, 575 (1977), and takings, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. 
v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104, 122–23, 138 (1978). It has also been held that corporations are 
persons protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection and 
procedural due process. Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (equal 
protection); Covington & L. Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896) (procedural 
due process). 
 34. The Supreme Court has declined to grant corporations full Fourth Amendment 
privacy rights. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 650–52 (1950), and any Fifth 
Amendment rights against self-incrimination. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74–75 (1906). 
It has also held that corporations are not persons for purposes of the privileges and 
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 177 (1869). 
Finally, the Court has repeatedly held that the liberty protections stemming from the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause do not extend to corporations. Hague v. 
Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 527 (1939) (citing Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 
203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906)) (“[T]he liberty guaranteed by the due process clause is the liberty 
of natural, not artificial, persons.”). This last ruling is perhaps the most relevant. If 
corporations are not persons entitled to liberty protections, then it suggests that 
corporations are not persons entitled to religious liberty protections. 
 35. See, e.g., Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the 
Future of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 909 (2011) (“No unified 
theory governs when or to what extent the Constitution protects a corporation.”); Susanna 
Kim Ripken, Corporate First Amendment Rights After Citizens United: An Analysis of the 
Popular Movement to End the Constitutional Personhood of Corporations, 14 U. PA. J. 
BUS. L. 209, 246 (2011) [hereinafter Ripken, Corporate First Amendment Rights] (“The 
Supreme Court has never developed a unified theoretical justification for its conclusion 
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a footnote in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,36 where it 
wrote that certain “purely personal” guarantees do not extend to 
corporations37 and that “[w]hether or not a particular guarantee is 
‘purely personal’ or is unavailable to corporations for some other 
reason depends on the nature, history, and purpose of the 
particular constitutional provision.”38 In other words, whether a 
constitutional provision should apply to a corporation depends on 
what exactly it is meant to protect.39 If the Free Exercise Clause 
protects something that is unique to natural people, then its 
protection should be limited to natural people. 
Despite scholarly disagreement about its perimeters, there is 
near universal agreement that at its core the Free Exercise Clause 
protects individual religious conscience.40 In Wallace v. Jaffree, for 
example, the Supreme Court wrote: “As is plain from its text, the 
First Amendment was adopted to curtail the power of Congress 
to interfere with the individual’s freedom to believe, to worship, 
and to express himself in accordance with the dictates of his own 
conscience.”41 Nor was this the only time the Supreme Court made 
this point.42 
 
that corporations are persons under the Constitution. Thus, there is no coherent, consistent 
way of defining corporate constitutional rights.”). 
 36. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 37. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14 (“Certain ‘purely personal’ guarantees, such as the 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, are unavailable to corporations and other 
organizations because the ‘historic function’ of the particular guarantee has been limited 
to the protection of individuals.”). 
 38. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14. 
 39. While the Supreme Court’s decisions have been described as “ad hoc” and 
“inconsistent,” Justice Rehnquist suggested that corporations should be granted 
constitutional rights if and only if those rights facilitate their economic activity. Bellotti, 
435 U.S. at 825 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that constitutional rights of 
corporations should be limited to those “necessary to carry out the functions of a 
corporation organized for commercial purposes”). Otherwise, rights should be reserved 
for natural persons. 
 40. See, e.g., Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and 
Doctrinal Development Part I. The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 
1386 (1967) (“The original constitutional consensus concerning religious liberty was an 
outgrowth of Protestant dissent and humanistic rationalism, the viewpoints that dominated 
the thinking of the authors of the Constitution. These two perspectives conjoined to place 
the individual conscience beyond the coercive power of the secular state.”). 
 41. 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985) (emphasis added). 
 42. See, e.g., Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (stating that 
the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause “is to secure religious liberty in the individual by 
prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority”); cf. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery 
Prot. Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988) (“[T]he Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of 
what the government cannot do to the individual . . . .”). 
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1. Religious Justification 
Why protect religious conscience? James Madison 
articulated a religious justification in his Memorial and 
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments when he argued, 
“It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage, 
and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him.”43 
Accordingly, the state should not hinder anyone from meeting her 
religious obligations.44 As Justice Souter explained, “[T]he [Free 
Exercise] Clause was originally understood to preserve a right to 
engage in activities necessary to fulfill one’s duty to one’s God.”45 
Failure to allow religious people to follow their conscience or 
meet their obligations may lead to great spiritual harm. Religious 
commandments are sometimes coupled with the threat of eternal 
punishment. Those acting out of love or duty46 rather than (or in 
addition to) fear may also suffer if unable to fulfill their religious 
duties.47 The Free Exercise Clause helps “avoid[] the cruelty” of 
forcing people to violate their religious beliefs.48 
2. Secular Justification 
A more secular reason to protect religious practice focuses 
on honoring individual autonomy. One need not agree with 
someone’s deeply held religious beliefs in order to conclude that 
there is value in respecting her decision to follow them. Ensuring 
 
 43. Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing Tp., 330 U.S. 1, 64 (1947) (citing 2 James 
Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in The Writings of 
James Madison 184 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901)). 
 44. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious 
Liberty, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1159, 1160 (2013) (“Freedom of religion, understood as a human 
legal right, is government’s recognition of the priority and superiority of God’s true 
commands over anything the state or anyone else requires or forbids.”). 
 45. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 575–76 
(1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (adding the caveat, “unless those activities threatened the 
rights of others or the serious needs of the State”). 
 46. See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Justifying Free Exercise Rights, 1 U. ST. THOMAS 
L.J. 504, 519–20 (2003) (noting that the relationship between an individual and God can 
be based on love). 
 47. Michael J. Perry, A Right to Religious Freedom? The Universality of Human 
Rights, the Relativity of Culture, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 385, 410 (2005) 
[hereinafter Perry, Human Rights] (“[A] government action/policy that denies freedom of 
religion to some human beings causes those human beings to suffer.”). 
 48. Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 9, 93 (2004); see also Jesse H. Choper, Defining ‘Religion’ in the First 
Amendment 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579, 597–98 (arguing that the purpose of free exercise 
exemptions is to reduce the psychological distress that believers might feel if forced to 
choose between conscience and compliance with law). 
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personal autonomy—that is, individual self-determination49—is a 
touchstone of constitutional rights.50 “Certain ‘zones of 
conscience’ are entitled to legal protection . . . . [to] protect the 
right of individuals to define and govern their own existence.”51 In 
particular, religious conscience is protected in order to safeguard 
“the right of an individual to make choices about his or her 
spiritual life.”52 
Under this view, compelling people to act contrary to their 
conscience may cause dignitary harm. “[T]he free exercise of 
religion is essentially a dignitary right. It is part of that basic 
autonomy of identity and self-creation which we preserve from 
state manipulation . . . because of its importance to the human 
condition.”53 The underlying assumption is that all human beings 
possess inherent dignity.54 “This dignity gives man an intrinsic 
worth, a value sui generis that is ‘above all price and admits of no 
equivalent.’”55 The explanations for why vary,56 and the 
relationship among conscience, autonomy, and dignity is not 
straightforward, but the three are inextricably linked, and the 
bottom line is that respecting religious autonomy/conscience is 
 
 49. Luís Roberto Barroso, Here, There, and Everywhere: Human Dignity in 
Contemporary Law and in the Transnational Discourse, 35 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
331, 368 (2012) (“The central notion [behind autonomy] is that of self-determination: An 
autonomous person establishes the rules that will govern his or her life.”). 
 50. Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 206 
(2011) (“The notion that humans deserve respect as free, autonomous, sovereign, and self-
determined agents is so entrenched in American political liberalism that it appears self-
evident.”). 
 51. Daniel O. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original 
Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 15 (2000). 
 52. Benjamin L. Berger, Law’s Religion: Rendering Culture, 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 
277, 309 (2007); see also DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 246 (1998) (noting 
that “religion is considered a core example of the kind of personal autonomy which the 
liberal state is pledged to protect”). 
 53. Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The 
Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 89, 95 (1990) [hereinafter Brownstein, Heavenly and Earthly Spheres]. 
 54. Perry, Human Rights, supra note 47, at 389 (“The conviction that every human 
being has inherent dignity [is] . . . fundamental to the morality of human rights.”); Neomi 
Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183, 196 
(2011) (“Of the various conceptions of dignity, the dignity that arises from one’s humanity 
is the most universal and open understanding of the term. This dignity indicates that worth 
and regard arise in each individual simply by virtue of being human.”). 
 55. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE ix (John Ladd 
trans. and ed., Library of Liberal Arts 1965) (1797). 
 56. “Multiple religious and philosophical theories and conceptions seek to justify this 
metaphysical view.” Barroso, supra note 49, at 335–37 (describing religious, philosophical, 
and historical sources for the concept of inherent worth). 
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very much about respecting the inviolable dignity of the human 
person.57 
3. Neither Justification Applies to For-Profit Corporations 
As should be apparent from this brief examination of the 
core goals of the Free Exercise Clause, this constitutional right 
only makes sense when applied to actual people. Whether the 
religious- or autonomy-based justification ultimately carries the 
day is irrelevant for purposes of determining corporate rights 
because both justifications are intimately tied to respecting 
human rights.58 
The religious justification, which centers on obligations to the 
divine, is about the relationship between “man and his Creator.” 
While people may fear and/or love God, and people may suffer 
sorrow, pain, shame, or guilt for acting contrary to conscience, for-
profit corporations cannot.59 As should be self-evident, 
corporations are not sentient and cannot feel anything.60 They 
have no sacred relationships,61 and they certainly do not have a 
soul.62 
 
 57. For example, Kant would argue human beings have inherent dignity because we 
are capable of rational, autonomous decisions, while others might argue people’s 
autonomous decisionmaking on intensely personal matters must be honored in order to 
respect their inherent dignity. Compare Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of 
Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 207 (2011) (“Kant claimed that human dignity derives 
from autonomy.”), with Edmund D. Pellegrino, Patient and Physician Autonomy: 
Conflicting Rights and Obligations in The Physician-Patient Relationship, 10 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 47, 48–49 (1993) (“Human beings are owed respect for their 
autonomy because they have an inherent dignity.”). 
 58. Cf. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[R]eligious belief takes shape within the minds 
and hearts of individuals, and its protection is one of the more uniquely ‘human’ rights 
provided by the Constitution.”). 
 59. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 466 (2010) (Breyer, J. dissenting) 
(“[C]orporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires.”). 
 60. Cf. Dynamic Image Techs., Inc. v. United States, 221 F.3d 34, 37 n.2 (1st Cir. 
2000) (“Because corporations, unlike natural persons, have no emotions, they cannot press 
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”); FDIC v. Hulsey, 22 F.3d 1472, 1489 
(10th Cir. 1994) (“Since a corporation lacks the cognizant ability to experience emotions, 
a corporation cannot suffer emotional distress.”). 
 61. So, for example, a Jewish person may break a covenant with God, a corporation 
cannot. 
 62. Liam Séamus O’Melinn, Neither Contract nor Concession: The Public Personality 
of the Corporation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 201, 251 (2006) (“Sir Edward Coke famously 
proclaimed that corporations ‘have no souls’”); cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: 
No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 
79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 386 n.2 (1981) (“In the thirteenth century Pope Innocent IV forbade 
the practice of excommunicating corporations on the unassailable logic that, since the 
corporation had no soul, it could not lose one.”). 
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The secular justification equally depends on uniquely human 
qualities. Respect for religious conscience ultimately traces back 
to ensuring respect for people’s dignity and autonomous 
decisionmaking. The dignity at issue is human dignity, based upon 
the idea that humans are ends in themselves, not means to an end. 
“[H]uman beings have no price and cannot be replaced because 
they are endowed with an absolute inner worth called dignity.”63 
While humans are inherently worthy, for-profit corporations, of 
course, are not. They are by definition instrumental entities—
legal fictions created to facilitate economic growth.64 “Their 
merely instrumental rationale leaves them with a morally 
different status than living flesh and blood people—the people 
Kant argues must be valued as ends . . . .”65 Dissolving or selling a 
corporation does not raise the same moral qualms as killing or 
selling a human being.66 In short, insofar as religion is concerned, 
corporations are not people, and they are not like people.67 They 
lack the fundamentally human attributes—whether it be a 
relationship with the divine or inviolable dignity—that justify 
religious liberty rights. 
In sum, the reasons why we protect the religious liberty of 
individual persons do not apply to corporate persons. 
Corporations do not have relationships with God. Corporations 
do not possess an inviolable dignity. To extend religious liberty 
exemptions to them distorts the constitutional order by providing 
accommodations to entities that neither need nor deserve them. 
B.  RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AS AN INSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
Free Exercise Clause protection also extends to churches, 
synagogues, mosques, temples, and other houses of worship 
(“churches” for short).68 Protecting churches facilitates individual 
 
 63. Barroso, supra note 49, at 360 (describing Kant’s view of human dignity). 
 64. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 466 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (“Corporations help 
structure and facilitate the activities of human beings, to be sure, and their ‘personhood’ 
often serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are not themselves members of ‘We the 
People’ by whom and for whom our Constitution was established.”). 
 65. C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 IND. L.J. 981, 
987–88 (2009). 
 66. Baker, supra note 65, at 988 (noting that killing a corporation elicits none of the 
“moral qualms that the death penalty famously raises for flesh-and-blood people.”). 
 67. Cf. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 394 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (“Although they make enormous contributions to our society, corporations are 
not actually members of it. They cannot vote or run for office.”). 
 68. The Hobby Lobby Court seemed to assume without discussion that all non-
profits (or perhaps all religious non-profits) were fully protected by the Free Exercise 
Clause. In fact, while free exercise protection for churches is well-established, free exercise 
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religious practice. After all, while religious practice may be a 
solitary endeavor for some, for others it is a group activity.69 As 
the Supreme Court has noted, “For many individuals, religious 
activity derives meaning in large measure from participation in a 
larger religious community.”70 To fully protect these religious 
individuals, it is necessary to protect their religious associations. 
Just as the Supreme Court saw no meaningful distinction 
between profit-seeking human people and profit-seeking 
corporate people, it saw no meaningful distinction between non-
profit corporations and for-profit corporations. According to the 
Supreme Court, since non-profit religious corporations like 
churches merit coverage, so should for-profit religious 
corporations as they are the same in all important respects. They 
both take the corporate form, and they both are institutions 
through which people exercise their religion.71 In fact, however, 
the reasons we protect churches do not ultimately apply to for-
profit corporations. 
Actually, the justifications and appropriate scope of free 
exercise protection for churches is hotly contested.72 This 
 
protection for other religious non-profit corporations is not. Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirito 
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006), and Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), all involved churches. The sole 
Free Exercise Clause or RFRA case with non-church plaintiffs, the religious schools in 
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), saw their free exercise challenge 
summarily rejected, making the case too thin a reed upon which to build expansive claims 
about religious liberty for all incorporated entities. 
 69. Douglas Laycock, Towards A General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case 
of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 
1389 (1981) [hereinafter Laycock, Church Autonomy] (“Religion includes important 
communal elements for most believers. They exercise their religion through religious 
organizations, and these organizations must be protected by the clause.”). 
 70. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987). 
 71. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2769 (2014) (“The dissent 
suggests that nonprofit corporations are special because furthering their religious 
‘autonomy . . . often furthers individual religious freedom as well.’ But this principle applies 
equally to for-profit corporations[.] . . . In these cases, for example, allowing Hobby Lobby 
[and] Conestoga . . . to assert RFRA claims protects the religious liberty of the Greens and 
the Hahns.”). 
 72. Compare Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious 
Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 917 (2013) with Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? 
Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273 
(2008) [hereinafter Garnett, Do Churches Matter?]; Paul Horwitz, Church as First 
Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 
(2009). The former argue that any free exercise protection for churches is derived from its 
members while the latter argue that churches qua churches are entitled to free exercise 
protection. 
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disagreement takes place across various dimensions.73 One issue 
relevant to corporate religious liberty is whether the Free 
Exercise Clause protects churches as a proxy for the individuals 
associated with them or protects churches qua churches. In other 
words, can churches be rights-holders separate and apart from the 
individuals that compose them? 74 
1. Church as Proxy 
One approach argues that we protect religious institutions 
only because we protect religious individuals, and any protection 
for churches derives from protection of its individual members.75 
For example, the European Commission on Human Rights has 
held that churches may only bring claims on behalf of their 
members, not in their own right.76 Some semblance of this 
approach appears in Harris v. McRae,77 where the Supreme Court 
rejected a conscience claim by a church group. The Court held 
that the Women’s Division of the Board of Global Ministries of 
the United Methodist Church lacked standing to bring a free 
exercise conscience claim.78 The church group argued that the 
 
 73. One issue, which pervades religion clause jurisprudence, is whether religion is 
special. For example, should religious individuals and their religious associations be 
accommodated to a greater degree than those whose deeply-held convictions are not 
religiously based? 
 74. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Recurring Paradox of Groups in the 
Liberal State, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 47, 55 (“A threshold question is the ontological status of 
groups in constitutional doctrine – that is, does the Constitution protect groups as such, or 
only as associations of individuals or to the extent that they enhance individual rights or 
interests?”). 
 75. See, e.g., Schragger & Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, supra 
note 72; cf. Richard W. Garnett, The Freedom of the Church, 4 J. CATHOLIC SOC. 
THOUGHT 59, 64 (2007) [hereinafter, Garnett, Freedom of the Church] (noting that “in our 
religious-freedom doctrines and conversations, it is more likely that the independence and 
autonomy of churches . . . are framed as deriving from, or existing in the service of, the 
free-exercise or conscience rights of individual persons than as providing the basis or 
foundation for those rights”). 
 76. Schragger & Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, supra note 72, at 
963 (“[T]he European Commission on Human Rights has held that churches have standing 
to bring claims under Article 9 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, but has stated quite clearly that the church does so 
only on behalf of its members.”); see also id. (noting that “consistent with this approach, 
the Commission has held that a legal person (as opposed to a natural person) does not 
enjoy freedom of conscience”). 
 77. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
 78. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 297, 321 (1980). The Court viewed the claim as 
one brought by an association on behalf of its members; as such, it had to satisfy the 
requirement that its prosecution did not require the presence of the individual members. 
Id. (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)) (holding 
that an association cannot have standing unless “neither the claim asserted nor the relief 
requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit”). 
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challenged regulation required its members to act contrary to 
their religious beliefs.79 Yet, according to the Court, because 
conscience claims protect individual conscience, they must be 
brought by an individual.80 
The proxy approach offers little support to for-profit 
corporate religious liberty claims, which, by definition, focus on 
corporate “conscience” rather than individual conscience.81 In any 
event, it assumes that the church is a voluntary association and, as 
discussed below, for-profit corporations do not fit that bill. 
2. Church as Church 
Another approach argues that churches are entitled to free 
exercise protection separate and apart from their members.82 
Under this approach, churches qua churches are religiously 
significant. It is hard to deny churches’ distinct place in religion 
clause jurisprudence. For example, the Tax Code contains a 
“parsonage exemption” that provides tax benefits to ministers of 
churches—a tax break available to no one else.83 Of all private 
non-profit organizations entitled to tax exempt status, only 
churches are not required to prove their exempt status,84 only 
churches are not required to file an annual tax return,85 and only 
churches are exempt from employment taxes.86 Along these lines, 
church property disputes are resolved differently than other 
property disputes.87 
 
 79. Harris, 448 U.S. at 321. 
 80. Id. (holding that since “it is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the 
coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion, 
the claim asserted here is one that ordinarily requires individual participation”). 
 81. In addition, if groups are merely a means to the end of enhancing individual 
liberty, then they are presumptively entitled to constitutional protection only to the extent 
that they do, in fact, enhance individual liberty of the group’s members. Frederick Mark 
Gedicks, The Recurring Paradox of Groups in the Liberal State, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 47, 56 
(2010). 
 82. Garnett, Freedom of the Church, supra note 75, at 71 (arguing for “recognition 
by the state of the freedom of the Church – for itself, and not simply as a proxy for the 
religious liberty rights of individuals”); Paul Horwitz, Church as First Amendment 
Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 125 (2009) 
(arguing that churches qua churches are entitled to free exercise protection). 
 83. 26 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West 2013). 
 84. 26 U.S.C.A. § 508 (c)(1)(A) (West 2013). 
 85. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6033(a)(3) (West 2013). 
 86. 26 U.S.C.A. § 3121 (West 2013). As with other tax benefits, this one is lost when 
the church engages in commercial activity that “assumes an independent purpose.” Church 
of Scientology of Cal. v. Comm’r, 83 T.C. 381, 459 (1984), aff’d 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 
1987). 
 87. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); 
Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian 
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Why are churches special?88 To start, many view their church 
as a sacred entity: “[T]he church is the institutional expression of 
what is other-worldly, holy, entitled to reverence.”89 According to 
the Catholic Code of Canon Law, for example, the Catholic 
Church “ha[s] the character of a moral person by divine ordinance 
itself.”90 Indeed, for some Catholic theologians, “[C]hrist’s 
identification with the Church is so complete that the Church 
must be seen as his earthly body, a sacred subject, the bride of 
Christ ‘without spot or wrinkle.’”91 In short, the argument is that 
churches deserve special treatment because of their link to the 
divine.92 
In addition, it has been argued that churches as independent 
institutions are pivotal in advancing free exercise. That is, 
churches further religious liberty not only because people worship 
communally but also because religious liberty “depended 
historically on the freedom of the Church as an independent 
spiritual authority.”93 For example, interfering with church 
autonomy “may disrupt the free development of religious 
doctrine.”94 Consequently, churches need a degree of autonomy, 
including the right to religious exemptions from otherwise 
applicable laws, in order to perform this function. 
The recent decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church & School v. EEOC95 could be viewed as endorsing the 
church-qua-church approach rather than the church-as-proxy 
approach: the Hosanna-Tabor Court sided with the church 
 
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox 
Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94 (1952). 
 88. Garnett, Freedom of the Church, supra note 75, at 80 (arguing that churches do 
more than play a mediating role in society in the way other voluntary associations do). 
 89. Richard W. Garnett, Pluralism, Dialogue, and Freedom: Professor Robert Rodes 
and the Church-State Nexus, 22 J.L. & RELIGION 503, 514 (2007). 
 90. Patrick McKinley Brennan, Are Catholics Unreliable from A Democratic Point of 
View? Thoughts on the Occasion of the Sixtieth Anniversary of Paul Blanshard’s American 
Freedom and Catholic Power, 56 VILL. L. REV. 199, 213 (2011). 
 91. Michael J. Perry, Catholics, the Magisterium, and Moral Controversy: An 
Argument for Independent Judgment (with Particular Reference to Catholic Law Schools), 
26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 293, 325 (2001); see also id. at 316 (noting that the Catholic Church 
is “understood theologically and analogically as Holy Mother”). 
 92. Schragger & Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, supra note 72, at 
925 (“Of course, for certain religionists, the church’s special institutional authority stems 
from God.”). How much weight religious arguments that those outside the faith do not 
share ought to have in the constitutional scheme of things is a separate question. 
 93. Garnett, Freedom of the Church, supra note 75, at 81; see also Garnett, Do 
Churches Matter?, supra note 72, at 274 (“The freedom of religion is not only lived and 
experienced through institutions, it is also protected and nourished by them.”). 
 94. Laycock, Church Autonomy, supra note 69, at 1392. 
 95. 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
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institution against an individual member and held that the religion 
clauses required a “ministerial exception”96 exempting churches 
from discrimination suits by their ministers.97 The rationale 
behind Hosanna-Tabor is that the government should not 
interfere with churches’ internal governance, especially their 
choice of ministers.98 The ministerial exemption is necessary not 
only because ministers embody the church’s beliefs,99 but also 
because they are instrumental in helping to shape them.100 The bar 
against “imposing an unwanted minister . . . protects a religious 
group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its 
appointments.”101 Since the choice of minister potentially “affects 
the faith and mission of the church itself,”102 the state should play 
no part in that decision.103 
The logic of the church-qua-church approach falters when 
applied to for-profit corporations. There are several significant 
differences between non-profit churches and for-profit 
corporations. Moreover, to argue that the two are 
indistinguishable tends to negate the reasons to treat churches as 
entitled to special autonomy in the first place.104 
First and most obviously, the practice and promulgation of 
religion is the overriding purpose of a church. Even assuming that 
an arts and crafts chain store or wood cabinet manufacturer is 
 
 96. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706 (“We agree that there is such a ministerial 
exception.”). 
 97. Although there was evidence suggesting Hosanna-Tabor fired a “minister” in 
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the ministerial exception precluded an 
ADA lawsuit. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 704. 
 98. Douglas Laycock describes church autonomy as “the right of churches to conduct 
[religious] activities autonomously: to select their own leaders, define their own doctrines, 
resolve their own disputes, and run their own institutions.” Laycock, Church Autonomy, 
supra note 69, at 1389. 
 99. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706 (explaining that government may not “depriv[e] 
the church of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs”). 
 100. See, e.g., Laycock, Church Autonomy, supra note 69, at 1391 (“When the state 
interferes with the autonomy of a church, and particularly when it interferes with the 
allocation of authority and influence within a church, it interferes with the very process of 
forming the religion as it will exist in the future.”). 
 101. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706. 
 102. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707; see also Laycock, Church Autonomy, supra 
note 69, at 1392 (arguing that interfering in personnel matters “may disrupt the free 
development of religious doctrine”). 
 103. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 704 (“It is impermissible for the government to 
contradict a church’s determination of who can act as its ministers.”). 
 104. Cf. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2794–95 (2014) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s ‘special solicitude to the rights of religious 
organizations,’ Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 132 S. 
Ct. 694, 706 (2012), however, is just that. No such solicitude is traditional for commercial 
organizations.”). 
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capable of exercising religion—itself a debatable proposition105—
it is unlikely to be its principal goal. By definition, for-profit 
corporations exist to make money; otherwise they would be non-
profit. Thus, the Supreme Court misses the mark when it argues 
that for-profit corporations are just like religious non-profit 
corporations except that they also make money. The difference is 
not that for-profit corporations have monetary goals; the 
difference is that for-profit corporations do not have 
predominantly religious goals. 
Second, for-profit corporations do not share the unique 
qualities that have been cited to justify churches’ preferential 
treatment. In the eyes of their followers, churches are sacred 
entities established by God. For-profit corporations are not. 
Churches are the source of theological truth. For-profit 
corporations are not. The ministerial exception recognized in 
Hosanna-Tabor is confined to the church’s relationship with its 
minister, because ministers are essential to the creation, 
embodiment, and dissemination of the faith.106 There is no logical 
counterpart to the minister in corporations because corporations 
simply do not play the same role as churches. While some might 
try to stretch the definition of a church (and minister) to include 
non-profit religious corporations,107 the term would become 
meaningless if expanded to include for-profit corporations. 
3. For-Profit Corporations Are Not Voluntary Associations 
A third major difference between non-profit churches and 
for-profit corporations is that both approaches, the church-as-
proxy and the church-qua-church, assume churches are voluntary 
 
 105. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir. 2013) (“General business corporations do not, separate 
and apart from the actions or belief systems of their individual owners or employees, 
exercise religion. They do not pray, worship, observe sacraments or take other religiously-
motivated actions separate and apart from the intention and direction of their individual 
actors.”). 
 106. The idea that church autonomy ultimately protects the development of beliefs 
rather than religious practice finds some support in the Court’s attempt to distinguish 
Employment Division v. Smith by claiming that Smith was about “outward physical acts” 
while Hosanna-Tabor concerns “the faith and mission of the church itself.” Hosanna-
Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707. As with many arguments in Hosanna-Tabor, whether it survives 
closer scrutiny is debatable. See Caroline Mala Corbin, The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 951, 954–55 (2012). But it 
does illuminate the Court’s conception of the free exercise protection extended. 
 107. Most obviously, Hosanna-Tabor’s church autonomy roots limit it to churches, or 
at the very most, religious organizations (like seminaries and day schools) that play a 
pivotal role in the creation and dissemination of doctrine. 
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religious associations.108 For-profit corporations, however, are 
not. 
Because any protection for a church depends on its members 
and must benefit its members under the church-as-proxy 
approach, it necessarily assumes that the church amounts to an 
aggregation of its individual members. The view of church and 
members as alter egos is shared by voluntary associations and 
underlies standing doctrine for voluntary associations: a voluntary 
association “is the appropriate party to assert [members’] rights, 
because it and its members are in every practical sense 
identical.”109 
While the church may be more than the sum of its parts in the 
church-qua-church approach, those parts are still voluntary 
members of the church. The Hosanna-Tabor Court certainly 
assumed it was dealing with a voluntary religious association.110 
The assumption is implicit in statements such as: “[T]he members 
of a religious group put their faith in the hands of their 
ministers.”111 Making this assumption more explicit, the 
concurrence observed that “[t]hroughout our Nation’s history, 
religious bodies have been the preeminent example of private 
associations.”112 It also referred to the rights of “voluntary 
religious associations”113 and the Court’s freedom of expressive 
association jurisprudence114 when explaining why churches must 
have the power to remove unwanted ministers. 
The voluntary nature of association is crucial to justifying 
church autonomy and ministers’ concomitant loss of civil rights 
 
 108. Schragger & Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, supra note 72, at 
959 (“[N]o one advocating church autonomy rejects voluntarism understood as a right of 
exit.”); Cf. Patrick Lofton, Any Club that Would Have Me as a Member: The Historical 
Basis for a Non-Expressive and Non-Intimate Freedom of Association, 81 MISS. L.J. 327, 
342 (2011) (noting that historically churches were considered “purely voluntary 
organizations” even if incorporated). 
 109. Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459 
(1958). 
 110. Cf. Evelyn Brody, Entrance, Voice, and Exit: The Constitutional Bounds of the 
Right of Association, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 821, 832 (2002) (“Among the oldest American 
associations are, of course, churches.”). 
 111. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706. The word “member” (as opposed to 
“employee”) and “group” (as opposed to “corporation”) are often used to describe those 
who voluntarily join an association. 
 112. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 712 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 113. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 713 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 114. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 712 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing Boys Scouts of 
Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000)). 
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under the ministerial exemption.115 It is permissible to exclude 
ministers from anti-discrimination law’s protection because they 
have consented to the church’s rather than the state’s adjudication 
of their employment claims. As the Supreme Court noted, “All 
who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied 
consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it.”116 
While this assumption may be contestable even in the case of 
ministers,117 it does explain the Court’s willingness to grant a free 
exercise exemption. The association is exempt because all who are 
affected by the exemption—everyone who will be subject to the 
rules of the religious association rather than the rules of civil 
society—have consented to it.118 
Thus even for churches, free exercise might protect church 
autonomy vis-à-vis its voluntary members, but not vis-à-vis those 
who have not voluntarily joined it. “An organization has no claim 
to autonomy when it deals with outsiders who have not agreed to 
be governed by its authority.”119 Consequently, to the extent that 
there is free exercise protection for churches, it is free exercise 
protection for voluntary religious associations. 
While it is true that individuals often exercise their rights 
through associations, for-profit corporations are not voluntary 
associations. First, the very things that define a modern 
corporation preclude viewing it as an association. Second, all 
those who are associated with the corporation cannot be 
described as voluntary members. 
 
 115. It is certainly presumed in the work of Douglas Laycock: “Voluntary affiliation 
with the group is the premise on which group autonomy depends.” Laycock, Church 
Autonomy, supra note 69, at 1405; see also Helfand, supra note 24, at 411 (“[T]he Court 
grounded the autonomy of religious institutions in the implied consent of their 
members.”). 
 116. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 713 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 117. For example, it could be argued that civil rights cannot be waived in advance, 
which is the general law for employees. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 
U.S. 36, 51 (1974) (employees may not by contract prospectively waive their civil rights). 
Alternatively, perhaps any waiver of civil rights should require actual consent, not implied 
consent. Or, perhaps it can be argued that implied consent cannot exist without a right of 
exit, which is not realistically available to those committed to their religion. See infra note 
150. 
 118. Brownstein, Heavenly and Earthly Spheres, supra note 53, at 100 (explaining that 
religious associations are “predicated on voluntary and consensual participation in a 
collective undertaking”). 
 119. Laycock, Church Autonomy, supra note 69, at 1406. 
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a. For-profit corporations are not associations 
Even if corporations are not like natural persons, perhaps 
they qualify as associations of natural persons and should be 
accorded free exercise protection not on their own behalf, but on 
behalf of their flesh and blood members. Hence the Court’s 
insistence that protecting corporations is ultimately about 
protecting the people associated with them: “An established body 
of law specifies the rights and obligations of the people (including 
shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with a 
corporation in one way or another. When rights, whether 
constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the 
purpose is to protect the rights of these people.”120 
Although crucial to the Court’s holding, its assumption that 
corporations like Hobby Lobby are essentially associations 
collapses under closer inspection. This is true whether a 
corporation is publicly traded or closely held, as were the family-
owned Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Conestoga Wood 
Specialties Corporation.121 The defining characteristics of modern 
corporations are inconsistent with viewing them as simply an 
aggregation of their individual members. Voluntary associations 
and their members may be alter-egos,122 but corporations and 
their members are not, precluding any argument that to protect 
corporate conscience is to protect the consciences of the people 
who comprise it.123 
Granted, the notion of the for-profit corporation as a 
voluntary association has some superficial appeal.124 It appealed 
 
 120. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014); see also id. 
(“[P]rotecting the free-exercise rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby [and] 
Conestoga . . . protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and control those 
companies.”). 
 121. While the Hobby Lobby ruling was limited to the closely-held companies that 
had sued, it reasoning its not necessarily confined to closely held corporations. Burwell, 
134 S. Ct. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Although the Court attempts to cabin its 
language to closely held corporations, its logic extends to corporations of any size, public 
or private.”). 
 122. Indeed, an association does not have standing unless its individual members 
would have standing in their own right. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 
U.S. 333, 343 (1977). 
 123. Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459 
(1958) (“Petitioner [NAACP, a voluntary association] is the appropriate party to assert 
that rights, because it and its members are in every practical sense identical.”). 
 124. The three theories of the corporation are (1) the concession theory, which views 
the corporation as “a creature of the State,” see infra note 125; (2) the aggregation theory, 
see infra notes 125-130 and accompanying text, which views it as an association of 
individual people; and (3) the view that currently prevails, the real entity theory. Reuven 
S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 999, 1001, 1032 
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY_FINAL DRAFT II (DO NOT DELETE) 7/8/2015  10:54 AM 
2015] CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 297 
 
to the Hobby Lobby Court. In fact, one of the early theories of 
the corporation conceived of it as an association of individuals.125 
The first cases extending personhood to corporations were based 
on an associational theory of corporations. Thus, when the 
Supreme Court first held that corporations were persons for equal 
protection purposes,126 it was with the understanding that the 
Court was protecting corporations in order to protect their 
owners. “[P]rivate corporations consist of an association of 
individuals united for some lawful purpose. . . But the members 
do not, because of such association, lose their right to protection, 
and equality of protection.”127 Consequently, the corporation’s 
property was really the property of its investors and should be 
treated as such:128 “To deprive the corporation of its property . . . 
is in fact, to deprive the corporators of their property.”129 Under 
this view of the corporation, often termed the aggregation or 
associational theory, the corporate person is the aggregation of 
the natural persons within, and is essentially their alter ego.130 
 
(2010). The real entity theory “views the corporation as neither the sum of its owners nor 
an extension of the state, but as a separate entity controlled by its managers.” Id. at 1001. 
 125. The aggregation theory followed the concession theory of the corporation, which 
dominated in the first half of the nineteenth century. The concession or artificial entity 
theory viewed the corporation as no more than the creation of the state. During this period, 
legislatures had to approve by special act the charter of each and every corporation. 
Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to 
the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 107 (2009) 
[hereinafter Ripken, Corporate Personhood Puzzle]. The most famous articulation of the 
concession view is from Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward: “A corporation is an 
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the 
mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation 
confers upon it.” 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819). 
The concession view declined when general incorporation became widely available. 
Ripken, Corporate Personhood Puzzle, at 109. This shift meant that the artificial entity 
theory, “under which the corporation derives its power from the state, lost most of its 
appeal, since the state was only vestigially involved in creating corporations.” Avi-Yonah, 
supra note 124, at 1011–12. The view that the corporation is artificial, however, is still with 
us. Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate Responsibility: 
Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135, 1149 (2012). After all, “[n]o one 
actually believes a corporation is a real person. Everyone recognizes that this fictional 
person is merely a legal abstraction.” Ripken, Corporate Personhood Puzzle, at 107. 
 126. Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 394 (1886) (noting that the Chief 
Justice prior to argument declared from the bench that corporations are persons for 
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause). 
 127. Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 18 F. 385, 402–03 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883). The Hobby 
Lobby Court echoed this claim when it complained that “[a]ccording to HHS, however, if 
these merchants chose to incorporate their businesses—without in any way changing the 
size or nature of their businesses—they would forfeit all RFRA (and free-exercise) rights.” 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2767 (2014). 
 128. Ripken, Corporate First Amendment Rights, supra note 35, at 221. 
 129. The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. 722, 747 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882). 
 130. Ripken, Corporate First Amendment Rights, supra note 35, at 221 (explaining that 
under aggregate theory, “the corporate person has no existence or identity that is separate 
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Nonetheless, the main characteristics of the modern 
corporation negate the notion that it is simply an aggregation of 
individuals. Three major features define the modern corporation: 
limited liability for shareholders, perpetual life for the 
corporation, and separation of owners and managers, especially 
in publicly traded corporations.131 By the end of the nineteenth 
century, all three had become standard.132 
Limited liability is perhaps the most salient characteristic of 
the modern corporation.133 Unlike partnerships or sole 
proprietorships, the shareholders of corporations are liable only 
for the amount they have invested.134 The investors’ finances and 
the corporation’s finances are separate, so that investors are not 
responsible for the corporation’s debts.135 Indeed, one of the main 
purposes of the corporate form is to create an entity that is distinct 
from its owners. Limiting liability in this way enhances 
corporations’ ability to attract capital,136 which in turn allows 
corporations to undertake expensive, large-scale projects. At the 
beginning of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court observed, 
“Corporations are a necessary feature of modern business 
activity, and their aggregated capital has become the source of 
nearly all great enterprises.”137 
Limited liability alone precludes equating the modern 
corporation with its shareholders. The modern corporation’s 
other features, such as perpetual life, further undermine an 
aggregate view—corporations potentially last forever; the people 
that compose them do not138—but limited liability suffices on its 
 
and apart from the natural persons in the corporation.”); see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 
124, at 1001 (explaining that aggregate theory “views the corporation as an aggregate of 
its members or shareholders”). 
 131. Advantageous tax treatment might be considered another. Citizens United v. 
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 465 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Unlike natural persons, 
corporations have ‘limited liability’ for their owners and managers, ‘perpetual life,’ 
separation of ownership and control, ‘and favorable treatment of the accumulation and 
distribution of assets.’”). 
 132. Avi-Yonah, supra note 124, at 1012. 
 133. Most states had adopted limited liability by the 1840s. Avi-Yonah, supra note 
124, at 1008–09. 
 134. In a partnership, for example, a general partner would be personally liable, i.e., 
liable to the whole extent of his property, for the debts of the partnership. UNIF. PART. 
ACT §306(a), 6 (Pt. 1) U.L.A. 117 (2001). 
 135. The reverse is true as well: the corporation’s assets cannot be attached by the 
investors’ creditors. Johnson, supra note 125, at 1154; MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT §6.22. 
 136. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 465 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 137. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906). 
 138. Ripken, Corporate Personhood Puzzle, supra note 125, at 112 (noting that 
corporations can last forever, “a perpetual existence, that its individual members did not 
share”). 
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own. As one scholar has noted, “Limited liability . . . led to a 
decline in the emphasis on the aggregate theory because the 
aggregate view of corporations tended to reduce the distinction 
between the corporation and its members or shareholders, which 
is at the heart of limited liability.”139 Aggregate theory assumes 
the shareholders and the corporation are one and the same, while 
limited liability insists that they are not.140 To equate the two, as 
the Hobby Lobby Court did, “eviscerate[s] the fundamental 
principle that a corporation is a legally distinct entity from its 
owners.”141 Thus even closely- held corporations where the 
shareholders are also the managers cannot qualify as associations. 
When the shareholders are not the managers, the 
associational argument, already implausible, becomes absurd. 
The shareholders cannot be considered the alter egos of their 
corporation when they play little role in running it, which is the 
case when ownership and management are separate.142 The rise of 
the business judgment rule, where a corporation’s directors are 
not liable to shareholders for their business decisions so long as 
the decisions were informed, made in good faith, and meant to 
benefit the corporation,143 further reduces the owners’ influence 
as it limits their ability to challenge management’s decisions. “The 
business judgment rule rejected the aggregate view in holding that 
the board of directors possessed powers that were not delegated 
from the shareholders and that shareholders could not normally 
call into question the exercise of those powers.”144 In sum, the 
modern corporation cannot be viewed as an association. 
 
 139. Avi-Yonah, supra note 124, at 1009. 
 140. See also Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 586 (1839) (rejecting the 
aggregate view because it “would make a corporation a mere partnership in business, in 
which each stockholder would be liable to the whole extent of his property for the debts 
of the corporation”). 
 141. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 389 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 142. Avi-Yonah, supra note 124, at 1011; see also Ripken, Corporate Personhood 
Puzzle, supra note 125, at 111–12 (noting that shareholders are often “passive investors” 
who “[do] not control the corporation in any meaningful sense”). 
 143. Adam J. Richins, Risky Business: Directors Making Business Judgments in 
Washington State, 80 WASH. L. REV. 977, 977 (2005) (“[T]he business judgment rule, as 
defined by leading corporate-law jurisdictions and the American Bar Association, 
generally protects directors from liability . . . so long as the director makes decisions in 
good faith, on an informed basis, without self-interest, and in accordance with the 
director’s belief of what is best for the corporation.”). 
 144. Avi-Yonah, supra note 124, at 1018. 
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b. Employees are not voluntary members 
Once employees are factored into the analysis, it becomes 
more evident than ever that a corporation cannot be described as 
a voluntary association. Employees of for-profit corporations 
cannot be equated to the voluntary members of a church. As 
Justice Ginsburg aptly noted in dissent, “Religious organizations 
exist to foster the interests of persons subscribing to the same 
religious faith. Not so of for-profit corporations.”145 
So far, I have not specified which natural persons potentially 
make up the corporate person. The previous section assumed that 
at a minimum it includes the corporation’s owners, and argued 
that under even this narrow view an aggregate theory makes no 
sense. In reality, though, a corporation is not so limited and must 
also include both those who manage it and those who work for 
it.146 A corporation could not function without its employees. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court only acknowledged in passing 
that employees are among those associated with a corporation, 
and never addressed the theoretical implications of that 
association. 
Although employees are indispensable members of a 
corporation,147 they are not equivalent to members of a church, or 
even members of other voluntary associations. Showing up for 
work five (or six) days a week is not the same as attending a 
church service, Boy Scouts meeting, or Rotary Club event. In a 
voluntary association, people join because “they are persuaded by 
the principles of the association,”148 and they have the ability to 
 
 145. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2795 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 146. Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, A Statutory Model for Corporate 
Constituency Concerns, 49 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1102 (2000) (“Employees . . . are as much 
members [of the firm] as shareholders who provide the capital.”). 
 147. Nelson, supra note 24, at 1601–02 (“[T]he emergence of stakeholder theory has 
emphasized that employees are critical to the overall operation of a business enterprise.”); 
Matthew T. Bodie, The Post-Revolutionary Period in Corporate Law: Returning to the 
Theory of the Firm, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1033, 1053 (2012) (“Although the subsequent 
theory of the firm literature has not been as explicitly employee-centric [as Ronald Coase], 
it has generally concurred regarding the importance of employees to the firm.”). 
 148. Jason Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639, 745 (2002) 
(“[T]he members of a voluntary association join, and remain members, because they are 
persuaded by the principles of the association . . . rather than because of motivations of 
money or the threat of state sanctions.”); Robert K. Vischer, The Good, the Bad and the 
Ugly: Rethinking the Value of Associations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 949, 965 (2004) 
(describing voluntary associations as “communities based on members’ common 
adherence to a distinct set of beliefs”). 
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exit.149 If your faith changes, you can switch churches.150 If you do 
not like the policies of the Boy Scouts, you can turn in your 
membership and join a different scouting organization.151 
In contrast, most people work because they must. They need 
the paycheck.152 Without a job, employees could not feed their 
families, meet their rent, or pay for healthcare. Laws that protect 
employees, including workplace anti-discrimination laws and 
minimum wage laws, are so strong precisely because of the 
essential nature of employment.153 In short, employment is an 
economic necessity. People cannot choose whether or not to 
work. 
One response might be that while employment itself may be 
compulsory, employment at these particular religious 
corporations may be voluntarily chosen precisely because of their 
principles. Despite the tendency to ignore employees altogether, 
as the Supreme Court more or less did, some of the more 
thoughtful corporate religious liberty supporters have 
acknowledged the importance of voluntariness.154 Nonetheless, 
 
 149. Andrew P. Morriss, The Market for Legal Education & Freedom of Association: 
Why the “Solomon Amendment” is Constitutional and Law Schools are not Expressive 
Assocations, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 415, 458 (2005) (describing as “critical features 
of associations” that “all members of associations have a cheap-to-exercise right of exit”). 
 150. At least this is true in theory. In reality, walking away from one’s religious 
community is not always so easy. See, e.g., Susan Moller Okin, “Mistresses of Their Own 
Destiny”: Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic Rights of Exit, 112 ETHICS 205 (2002). 
 151. Again, this presumes that an equivalent to the Boy Scouts is readily available, 
which is not always the case. See Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 
567 n.238 (2001) (arguing that Boy Scouts is a monopoly). 
 152. Nelson, supra note 24, at 1602 (noting that studies of corporate employees 
establish that financial compensation is the main reason people work); cf. Mazzone, supra 
note 148, at 746 (“[A] workplace is often non-voluntary because most people need 
income.”). 
 153. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act forbids sexually harassing speech 
in the workplace if it creates a hostile work environment. 42 U.S.C. § 200(e)-2a (2000); 
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (recognizing hostile work environment 
claims). These limits on speech would violate the Free Speech Clause if banned outside 
the employment context. That these speech restrictions are allowed in the workplace 
underscores (a) the importance of employment and (b) the understanding that exit is not 
an option in the workplace in the same way it is outside the workplace. 
 154. Ronald J. Colombo, The Corporation As a Tocquevillian Association, 85 TEMP. 
L. REV. 1, 45 (2012) (“An employee vote . . . would go a long way toward establishing the 
authenticity and credibility of a corporation’s claims of association.”); Helfand, supra note 
24, at 411 (arguing that court should consider employees’ perspective when evaluating 
corporate claims). While he was addressing exemptions for churches rather than 
exemptions for for-profit corporations, Douglas Laycock also emphasized that 
voluntariness was a necessary predicate. See supra notes 115 and 119 and accompanying 
text. 
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they tend to be too quick to assume its presence.155 For example, 
in arguing that for-profit corporations can qualify as associations, 
one proponent explains that he does not mean all for-profit 
corporations, only those that amount to “a genuine community of 
individuals—investors, owners, officers, employees, and 
customers—coming together around a common shared vision or 
shared set of goals, values, or beliefs.”156 Despite this caveat, he is 
satisfied that the cooks and cashiers who work for a national fast-
food chain “appear to actively support” their CEO’s religious 
values because, well, the CEO’s views are no secret.157 Apparently 
by virtue of accepting employment with a clearly religious 
corporation, an employee accepts its corporate values and rules.158 
After all, if the employee’s beliefs differ, she can simply work 
elsewhere.159 
This claim is neither empirically supported nor is it likely to 
be.160 Granted, some employees may well know and share the 
religious views of their employers. Yet with 13,000 employees 
nationwide and Title VII’s bar on religious discrimination, large 
corporations like Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. are bound to be 
religiously diverse.161 Moreover, while some dissatisfied 
 
 155. But see Vischer, For-Profit Businesses, supra note 24, at 391 (acknowledging that 
“[w]e are uncomfortable exempting corporations from the law’s authority because it can 
be difficult for individuals to exempt themselves from the corporation’s authority”). 
 156. Colombo, Naked Private Square, supra note 24, at 53. 
 157. Colombo, Naked Private Square, supra note 24, at 66; see also id. (“[C]ustomers 
and employees are well aware of [the corporation’s biblical values], as the chain’s beverage 
holders are imprinted with biblical verses, and the company’s stores do not open on 
Sundays in observance of the Christian Sabbath.”). Indeed, while Colombo is willing to 
speculate “that customers and employees appear to actively support” the CEO’s views, the 
accompanying footnote cites to (1) a news story about customer support not employee 
support and (2) employee reviews, almost none of which mention religion at all. 
 158. See, e.g., Helfand, supra note 24, at 424 (arguing that accepting a job with a 
corporation that “holds itself out as strongly committed to religious principles” essentially 
means giving consent to abide by its religious decisions regarding the contraception 
mandate); cf. Laycock, Church Autonomy, supra note 69, at 1409 (in discussing church 
employees, arguing that “[w]hen an employee agrees to do the work of the church, he must 
be held to submit to church authority in much the same way as a member”). 
 159. Editorial, Contraception Mandate Violates Religious Freedom, USA TODAY 
(Feb. 5, 2012, 6:28 PM), available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/
editorials/story/2012-02-05/contraception-mandate-religious-freedom/52975796/1 
(“[H]aving freely chosen their employer, they’d have a dubious case for grievance against 
institutions that choose not to offer contraception coverage.”). 
 160. Kent Greenfield, Defending Stakeholder Governance, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
1043, 1060 (2008) (“[A]rguments about the market power of . . . employees in particular 
seem fanciful to anyone keeping up with the state of working America in the early twenty-
first century.”). 
 161. The career page of the company’s website states that “Hobby Lobby is an Equal 
Opportunity Employer.” Careers, HOBBY LOBBY, http://www.hobbylobby.com/careers/ 
(last visited July 5, 2014). 
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employees may be able to find a comparable full-time position 
without difficulty, the assumption that employees are always able 
to choose employers whose values match their own relies on a 
Lochner-era view of employment opportunities.162 In short, if a 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. sales associate disagrees with her 
benefits package, there is probably not much she can do about 
it.163 
The claim that dissenting employees can simply find a more 
amenable job is not only unrealistic but also somewhat 
unprincipled. Again, the Hobby Lobby Court did not make this 
argument; it ignored the issue altogether. Corporate religious 
liberty plaintiffs, however, have, without ever explaining why the 
“find an alternate” argument does not apply to them. If they do 
not like the restrictions placed on running a corporation, then 
perhaps they should find another endeavor where their religious 
practices do not clash with employment laws. Indeed, the 
argument arguably has stronger force with regard to for-profit 
corporations: society grants them certain special advantages, 
including limited liability and other financial benefits. Those 
benefits are coupled with certain obligations.164 Among them is to 
obey society’s employment protection laws. 
In sum, the claim that for-profit corporations deserve 
religious exemptions just like churches is deeply flawed. That 
corporate employees are not voluntary in the same way as church 
members are is one of many reasons why arts and crafts stores, 
wood cabinet makers, and HVAC equipment manufacturers 
differ from St. Augustine Church, Temple Beth-Am, or Masjid ul 
Mumilneen.165 These for-profit corporations simply do not share 
 
 162. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. 
REV. 283, 323 (1998) (rejecting the assumption that “workers are voluntary participants in 
the firm and have the power to protect themselves” due to “inefficiencies and illiquidity in 
the labor market”). 
 163. This lack of choice is not limited to low-income hourly earners. A former 
professor at Notre Dame University, after emphasizing that over 200 people had applied 
for her position, wrote, “If you thought people must surely know in advance that working 
at a Catholic university will restrict their health care choices, or that people who don’t want 
to work within those restrictions can simply find another job, I am here to tell you that you 
are wrong on both counts.” Jennifer Glass, Opinion, Contraception Issue More Than Just 
Politics, CNN (Feb. 10, 2012, 5:28 PM), available at http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/10/
opinion/glass-contraception. 
 164. See, e.g., Patricia Nassif Fetzer, The Corporate Defamation Plaintiff as First 
Amendment ‘Public Figure’: Nailing the Jellyfish, 68 IOWA L. REV. 35, 65 (1982) (“The 
individual who chooses to incorporate derives the benefits of the corporate form. That 
individual also submits to the obligations attending incorporation.”). 
 165. Cf. Vischer, For-Profit Businesses, supra note 24, at 374 (noting “our intuitive 
reluctance to equate the free exercise claims of Wal-Mart with those of First Presbyterian 
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the qualities that have been cited to justify churches’ preferential 
treatment. First, their overriding purpose is not religion. Second, 
they are not sacred. Third, they do not play a pivotal role in 
protecting and advancing religion. Fourth, it is impossible to 
describe for-profit corporations as voluntary religious 
associations. 
PART II: THE HARM OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY 
Religious exemptions for for-profit corporations are 
problematic not just because they are without theoretical 
foundation, but because they will harm the employees of 
exempted corporations. To start, for-profit corporations will seek 
exemptions from laws—such as the contraception mandate—that 
are meant to protect their employees. In addition, corporate 
religious liberty will come at the expense of employees’ individual 
religious liberty. 
Religious accommodations have always raised the concern 
that the religious observer will become above the law.166 Besides 
the risk of legal chaos,167 exemptions risk imposing substantial 
burdens on third parties. Not all religious exemptions impose on 
others,168 but many do. When a Sabbath observer refuses weekend 
shifts, odds are a co-worker will be assigned them.169 The greater 
the burden-shifting, the more problematic the exemption.170 
Exemptions from the contraception mandate rank as highly 
burdensome. The corporate actors litigating these actions are not 
small mom-and-pop establishments but large companies. After 
 
Church”). Vischer astutely observes that extending the same level of protection to 
businesses runs the risk of diminishing protection for all religious claimants. Id. at 387. 
 166. Emp’t Div., Dep’t Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (“Can a man 
excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would 
be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and 
in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.” ). 
 167. Id. at 888 (holding that contemplating an exemption any time a law conflicts with 
someone’s faith would be “courting anarchy, [and] that danger increases in direct 
proportion to the society’s diversity of religious beliefs”). 
 168. For example, allowing sacramental use of hoasca, an otherwise illegal drug, does 
not burden any third party. Cf. Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do 
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
 169. Cf. Estate of Thorton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985). 
 170. Frederick Mark Gedicks and Rebecca Van Tassell argue that when the burden-
shifting is great enough, as it is with the contraception mandate cases, the religious 
exemption violates the Establishment Clause. RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception 
Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
(forthcoming). 
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all, the mandate only applies to corporations with more than fifty 
full-time employees. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., for example, with 
its 500 plus stores, earns roughly 3 billion dollars every year and 
employs more than 13,000 full-time employees.171 To grant Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., an exemption is to affect thousands. 
Furthermore, a religious exemption from the contraception 
mandate is an exemption from a law enacted in order to help 
employees—here by increasing employee access to basic health 
care.172 From what other healthcare requirement might 
corporations seek to exempt themselves?173 Might corporations 
that oppose homosexuality be able to withhold from same-sex 
spouses the health care benefits they otherwise provide spouses? 
Indeed, what employee protection might be challenged next? The 
Fair Labor Standards Act?174 The Federal Occupational Safety 
and Health Act?175 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act?176 The Family 
and Medical Leave Act? 177 Despite the Supreme Court’s claim 
that its decision is narrow,178 corporate religious liberty leaves all 
these employee protections vulnerable to religious exemptions. 
 
 171. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.’s annual sales are listed as three billion dollars. 
America’s Largest Private Companies, Hobby Lobby Stores, FORBES, http://www.
forbes.com/companies/hobby-lobby-stores/ (updated Oct. 2014). Its owner,  David Green, 
is number 81 in Forbes Magazine’s list of the wealthiest people in the United States with 
an estimated worth of $6.2 billion dollars. Forbes 400, FORBES, http://www.
forbes.com/forbes-400/list/#tab:overall (last visited Apr. 9, 2015). 
 172. Cf. Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 689 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting) 
(“[B]y permitting the corporate employers to rewrite the terms of the statutorily-mandated 
health plans they provide to their employees. . . . employees are left without a highly 
important form of insurance coverage that Congress intended them to have.”). 
 173. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2805 (2014) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Would the exemption the Court holds RFRA demands for 
employers with religiously grounded objections to the use of certain contraceptives extend 
to employers with religiously grounded objections to blood transfusions (Jehovah’s 
Witnesses); antidepressants (Scientologists); medications derived from pigs, including 
anesthesia, intravenous fluids, and pills coated with gelatin (certain Muslims, Jews, and 
Hindus); and vaccinations (Christian Scientists, among others)?”). 
 174. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2013). 
 175. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2013). 
 176. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2013). 
 177. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2013); see also, e.g., 
Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 691–92 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that corporate religious liberty might let corporations deny FMLA leave to same-sex 
parents). 
 178. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2760 (“As this description of our reasoning shows, our 
holding is very specific. We do not hold, as the principal dissent alleges, that for-profit 
corporations and other commercial enterprises can ‘opt out of any law (saving only tax 
laws) they judge incompatible with their sincerely held religious beliefs.’”); see also id. at 
2783 (“In any event, our decision in these cases is concerned solely with the contraceptive 
mandate. Our decision should not be understood to hold that an insurance-coverage 
mandate must necessarily fall if it conflicts with an employer’s religious beliefs.”). 
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To make matters worse, granting religious exemptions to for-
profit corporations will exacerbate the power imbalance between 
corporate employers and their employees.179 With their vast 
concentrations of wealth, there is no gainsaying the power of 
corporations. “Corporations are more powerful than any 
institution other than government, and in many cases, more 
powerful than governments.”180 As Justice Stevens observed in his 
Citizens United dissent, corporations “inescapably structure the 
life of every citizen.”181 Their power is not the same as the states, 
but it is potentially just as coercive.182 Thus, “individuals,” 
including employees, “arguably can be victims of corporate 
oppression as easily as victims of state oppression.”183 Interpreting 
the Free Exercise Clause (and RFRA) as granting corporations 
the right to religious exemptions will substantially “enhance their 
repressive power.”184 This is especially true when the corporation 
 
 179. The growing income inequality in the United States is just one indicator of a 
significant power imbalance. See, e.g., Max Fisher, Map: U.S. Ranks Near Bottom on 
Income Inequality, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 19, 2011, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/09/map-us-ranks-near-bottom-on-
income-inequality/245315/ (“Income inequality is more severe in the U.S. than it is in 
nearly all of West Africa, North Africa, Europe, and Asia.”); Emmanuel Saez, Striking it 
Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States, UC BERKELEY, Sept. 3, 2013, 
available at http://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2012.pdf (finding that 
between 1993-2012, the real income of the top 1% grew 86.1% compared to the 6.6% 
growth for the remaining 99%). 
 180. William Quigley, Catholic Social Thought and the Amorality of Large 
Corporations: Time to Abolish Corporate Personhood, 5 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 109, 110 
(2004). 
 181. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 465 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also 
Fetzer, supra note 164, at 63–64 (“The modern corporation may be regarded not simply as 
one form of social organization but potentially (if not yet actually) as the dominant 
institution of the modern world.” (quoting ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE 
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 356 (1932))). 
 182. Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism, Berle and Means and 20th-Century 
American Legal Thought, 30 LAW. & SOC. INQUIRY 179, 180 n.2 (2005) (“While the 
corporation’s power to enforce its rule is different from the power of the sovereign state 
to do so, the corporation’s economic, social, and cultural impact has become so pervasive 
in modern society as to make corporate power, in effect, comparable to the coercive power 
of the state.”). 
 183. Ripken, Corporate Personhood Puzzle, supra note 125, at 142–43; cf. Lawrence 
E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise 
of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1413 (1967) (“The great majority of 
employees realize that they are expendable, and this realization renders them easy prey to 
the employer’s overreaching demands.”). 
 184. Ripken, Corporate Personhood Puzzle, supra note 125, at 145 (“If organizations 
are seen as potentially repressive systems of governance, treating them as individuals and 
granting them the protections, immunities, and liberties of individuals will just enhance 
their repressive power.” (quoting Meir Dan-Cohen, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND 
ORGANIZATIONS 176 (1986))). 
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY_FINAL DRAFT II (DO NOT DELETE) 7/8/2015  10:54 AM 
2015] CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 307 
 
is the gatekeeper to basic human needs like preventive health 
care.185 
Finally, granting a conscientious exemption for Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc. or Conestoga Woods Specialties Corporation 
(or another corporation) will impose on the religious conscience 
of its employees. Religious obligations can point towards 
contraception use as well as away from it. For example, according 
to one expert, “[I]n the thinking of mainstream Protestant 
Christian Ethics . . . nearly no aspect of life is more sacred, closer 
to being human in relation to God, than bringing new life into the 
world to share in the gift of God’s grace and God’s covenant.”186 
Accordingly, the testimony continues, “In bringing new life into 
the world human beings must be sure that the conditions into 
which the new life is being born will sustain that life in accordance 
with God’s intention for the life to be fulfilled.”187 
Consequently, a corporation’s refusal to allow its insurance 
company to provide contraception will impose on, for example, a 
mother who has strong conscientious beliefs, beliefs rooted in 
religious precept, that she could not fulfill her parental 
responsibilities if she had any (more) children.188 In other words, 
enabling a large corporation to act according to its “conscience” 
will make it harder for its employees to follow theirs.189 
Perhaps this imposition is acceptable when association is 
voluntary. But for employees of for-profit corporations, it is not.190 
 
 185. The contraception mandate litigation could have been avoided if the United 
States had government-provided single payer health care as most other industrialized 
countries do. 
 186. McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 700 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), rev’d sub nom., Harris 
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); see also id. at 696 (describing testimony that under Jewish 
law a new pregnancy should be avoided “if the new pregnancy threatens the milk available 
for a baby still being nursed”). 
 187. McRae, 491 F. Supp. at 700. 
 188. Margaret Sullivan, Editorial, A Grandmother on Sex, Contraception and 
Religious Freedom, HUFFINGTON POST, July 17, 2013, available at http://www.huffington
post.com/margaret-sullivan/a-grandmother-on-sex-cont_b_3600880.html (“For my 
parents, birth control was integral to a deeply moral and religious worldview of individual 
responsibility for life.”). 
 189. This risk is not necessarily limited to employees of for-profit corporations. For 
example, when courts recognize that non-profit institutions such as Catholic hospitals have 
a conscientious right to deny certain medical procedures such as abortion, it imposes on 
the conscience of individual doctors working there who believe it is their religious, medical, 
and ethical obligation to provide all medically necessary treatment for their patients. See 
generally Spencer L. Durland, The Case Against Institutional Conscience, 86 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1655 (2011); Elizabeth Sepper, Taking Conscience Seriously, 98 VA. L. REV. 1501 
(2012). It also imposes on their patients, especially when the Catholic hospital is the only 
one serving their area. 
 190. See supra Part I.B.3.b. 
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This awareness may well be what prompted the Supreme Court 
to suggest that for-profit enterprises are not eligible for free 
exercise protection: When rejecting the free exercise claim of an 
Amish employer, Court wrote: “Granting an exemption . . . to an 
employer operates to impose the employer’s religious faith on the 
employees.”191 
In addition to allowing corporations to dictate their 
employees’ health care options, granting religious exemptions to 
corporations will have wide-ranging repercussions.192 It will set a 
precedent for corporations to escape legal requirements designed 
to protect employees against their more powerful and potentially 
exploitive employers. Privileging corporate religious conscience 
over employee religious conscience also risks making religious 
liberty yet another luxury reserved for those at the top. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no basis for corporate religious liberty. The 
theoretical justifications for free exercise exemptions do not lead 
to corporate religious liberty. Exemptions to individuals are 
granted in order to accommodate people’s religious conscience. 
Unlike actual people, however, for-profit corporations have 
neither a relationship with the divine nor an inherent dignity that 
must be respected. Exemptions for churches, considered sacred 
and theologically significant, are granted for reasons not 
applicable to for-profit corporations. If nothing else, corporations 
are not like churches because they cannot be classified as 
voluntary associations. Most troublesome, corporate religious 
liberty sacrifices employees’ employment and religious rights in 
order to benefit (powerful) corporate employers. 
 
 191. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982). 
 192. Jean Bucaria, To The Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8. 2013, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/09/opinion/birth-control-and-religious-freedom.html 
(“When we let our bosses pick and choose what medical care we have access to, we are 
protecting the private beliefs of a few to deny the essential needs of many.”). 
